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ABSTRACT: The ban of Rabbenu Gershom forbade both polygamy and divorcing a
woman against her will. The ban has been seen by historians as a key determinant of the
singularity of Ashkenazi Jewish culture. In sixteenth-century Poland there were two
main approaches among halakhic scholars towards the ban: one, represented by R.
Solomon Luria adhered strictly to the Ashkenazi legal tradition; the second, represented
by R. Shalom Shakhna and R. Moses Isserles, was open to other Jewish legal traditions.
Is this phenomenon related to the Early Modern Period? And if so, how is it related? My
discussion in the workshop shall focus on these questions.

This presentation is for the following text(s):
Responsa Maharshal No. 14
Responsa Maharshal No. 65
Shulkhan Arukh, Glosses by Moses Isserles
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Introduction to Maharshal's Responsum no. 14
Elimelekh Westreich

The ban of Rabbenu Gershom forbade both polygamy and divorcing a woman against
her will. The ban has been seen by historians as a key determinant of the singularity of
Ashkenazi Jewish culture. In sixteenth-century Poland there were two main approaches
among halakhic scholars: one, represented by R. Solomon Luria adhered strictly to the
Ashkenazi legal tradition; the second, represented by R. Shalom Shakhna and R. Moses
Isserles, was open to other Jewish legal traditions. Is this phenomenon related to the
Early Modern Period? And if so, how is it related? My discussion in the workshop will
focus on these questions.
In the middle ages, Ashkenazi Jewish women enjoyed strong legal protection of their
marital status through R. Gershon’s ban (Chadrag), which prohibited marrying a second
wife and divorcing a woman against her will. The high status of the enactments was
manifested in three areas: (1) their legal basis, which was legislation in the publiccriminal area of the law; (2) the rejection of solid grounds on the part of the husband,
such as observance of the commandment to be fruitful and multiply or of the levirate
commandment, and at times even of a combination of such grounds (as, for example,
when the woman was out of her mind and the man did not observe with her the
commandment to be fruitful and multiply and could not maintain matrimonial
relations); and (3) the procedural area, which specifies the rigid and complicated
process required to lift the ban and the sanctions imposed in case it is violated. The
prestige and strength that the two enactments enjoyed was the outcome of a long
process resulting, among others, from such halachic changes as the decline of the
halacha of the rebellious woman, which enabled women to coerce their husbands to
divorce them. Ashkenazi Jewish society internalized the enactments very deeply, to the
point where bigamist marriage was perceived as living with a legal wife and a prostitute.
Throughout the middle ages, the presence of other traditions in Spain, the
Mediterranean basin, and in the East did not pose a threat to the Ashkenazi tradition on
its territory. The encounter between the legal traditions of the various communities
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always took place on non-Ashkenazi territory. When he served as rabbi of Spain at the
first quarter of the fourteen century, Rosh tried to inculcate there the Ashkenazi
tradition, directly and indirectly. At this time, in Spain, Rashba was asked by an
Ashkenazi scholar to lift Chadrag because of his wife’s insanity, after his request was
refused in Ashkenaz. This sage is also the originator of the rumor that Chadrag expired
at the end of the fifth millennium (1240), which in time would play an important role in
the halachic discussion. A hundred a fifty years later, in a legal debate, Maharil raised
the possibility that a man whose wife lost her mind can go to Italy, where Chadrag may
be lifted.
Only at the end of the 15th century is there a serious challenge placed before a great
Ashkenazi sage, R. Yehuda Mintz, who served as the rabbi of Padua in the Venetian
Republic. R. Gershon Bonfazo, the Romaniot rabbi of Corfu, married a second wife
because he was not able to perform the commandment to be fruitful and multiply with
his first wife, an action that received the approval of the Romaniot R. Eliahu Mizrahi,
head of the rabbis in the Ottoman Empire. R. Yehuda Mintz adopted an extreme attitude
in preferring Chadrag over the commandment, and banned the Romaniot rabbi for his
action. R. Yehuda Mintz based his position on purely Ashkenazi sources as well as on
discretion and opinion, but did not address various Sephardic sources that opposed his
view. Some decades later, however, a significant change occurred in the community of
Ashkenazi rabbis there. R. Meir of Padua, the husband of R. Mintz’s granddaughter and
heir to his position at the head of the Padua Yeshiva, rejected the approach that
strengthens Chadrag beyond measure, and gave decisive weight to Sephardic sources
that reject Chadrag in favor of the commandments.
The Polish extension of the Ashkenazi community, which by the 16th century had risen
in quality and quantity above the motherland in Ashkenaz, faced a new reality that
reflected the changes occurring at the beginning of the modern era. At this time, the
large Jewish centers were growing closer to each other, resulting in a phenomenon of
mini-globalization or regionalization. This was reflected in the discussion by Rashal of
the first case [Res. Maharshal, Ch. 14] of a member of his community who left his wife in
Poland and went to the town of Pleven, in the Ottoman Empire. In this region and
around it lived Jews of other communities that, unlike the Ashkenazim, did not grant
Chadrag a high legal status. The Romaniots apparently recognized that Chadrag applied
to them, but held that it was superseded by commandments such as that to be fruitful
and multiply. Moreover, they did not enhance the strength of Chadrag in the areas of
enforcement and relief. The Sephardim did not consider themselves to be subject the
Chadrag at all, and a tradition existed among them that even with respect to
Ashkenazim Chadrag expired at the end of the fifth millennium.
The proximity between the centers was manifest in the quality of the communication
between them, which took place nearly in real time and on several levels. The constant
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correspondence and traffic of messengers between the centers is described in detail in
the responsa and integrated in the halachic debate. The connection also produced a
strong dependence between the legal work taking place in Poland and the required close
cooperation between the legal institutions in the two locations. This phenomenon
contains pure elements of private international law intended to enable cooperation
between different autonomous legal systems.
The importance of the flow of information in this case is clear, as the challenge to the
validity of Chadrag, at least under certain circumstances, is the moving force behind the
entire case. This flow seems to have been made possible by an additional factor that
appeared at this time, the invention of the printing press. Rashba’s responsa, that had
been recently printed, and the printing of the work of R. Yosef Karo and of the books of
responsa of such Italian sages as Maharik, Mahari Mintz, and Maharam Padua quickly
made public the tradition regarding the expiration of Chadrag and the associated
debates. The links made possible by the printing press are even more prominent in the
legal work of Rama. In his comments to Shulhan Aruch as well as in his work Darkei
Moshe, he expresses positions other than those common in the Ashkenazi tradition,
which contributed to the erosion of at least the moral dimension of Chadrag, and from
then on the claims concerning its expiration and the preeminence of the
commandments became legitimate. However, Rama eventually ruled that Chadrag
remains valid and that violators who marry a second wife must be coerced.
The conduct of Rama was similar to that of his great Sephardic colleague, R. Yosef Karo,
who also featured in his writings approaches that differed from his own even if he
eventually summarized the halacha according to his own views. This approach was
radically different from that reflected in the writings and rulings of Rashal, Rama’s
Polish colleague. Rashal rejected unequivocally the tradition claiming that Chadrag had
expired at the end of the fifth millennium, and criticized Rashba mercilessly. He also
went to extremes in the second answer [paragraph 65], and sharpened further the
Ashkenazi legal tradition by making Chadrag a nearly absolute legal factor, not to be
lifted even in extreme circumstances in which several reasons converge: the insanity of
the wife, impossibility to maintain matrimonial relations, and impossibility of observing
the commandment to be fruitful and multiply. This tendency was further underscored
by the nature of the sources that Rashal quoted in his answer. Unlike Rama, who
absorbed the new products of the printing press, Rashal surveyed old Ashkenazi
manuscripts and found Raviya’s answer, which had been shelved for four hundred years.
This answer became the basis for the opposition to any attempt to lift either component
of Chadrag, whatever the reasons of the husband may be.
Eventually, Rama’s method, which was open to changes occurring at the beginning of
the modern era and communicated with the important sages of the large center being
formed in the Ottoman Empire, was preferred over Rashal’s conservative method that
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sought to perpetuate the Ashkenazi halachic past and maintain it in splendid isolation.

Bibliography
bib goes here

Copyright © 2012 Early Modern Workshop

24

EMW - Workshops
EMW 2008

EARLY MODERN WORKSHOP: Jewish History Resources
Volume 5: Law: Continuity and Change in the Early Modern Period, 2008, Yeshiva
University, New York, NY

Responsa Maharshal No. 14
Shut Maharshal, Siman 14

Maharshal (Solomon Luria), 16th-17th century
Translated by Elimelekh Westreich

(Res. Maharshal,Ch. 14)

1. Appeal to the Pleven community and R. Eliezer fro Nikopol

To the holy community of Pleven… At first I shall greet R. Eliezer the elder who resides
in Nikopol [55 km to the north-east of Pleven] and he is the master of the case.

2. Background – Deserting a wife in Poland
I would like to inform you about a wicked case that occurred with one named R.
Abraham b. Shlomo Halevi, a member of our community. He was already married to a
woman from our town, named Sarah d. of Chaim Halevi… to be with her for their entire
life, together with their son that G-d bestowed upon him seven years ago. Despite all this
he betrayed the heaven's covenant with his young wife and deserted her, leaving her in
poverty. And not only did he fail to fulfill his three duties [which are imposed on the
husband, that is food, clothing, and sexual relations], but also mistreated her by
marrying another wife.

3. The first reaction of the community of Pleven
Blessed are you the creators of the hedges that prevent Judea and Israel from sinning.
You ordered him in advance not to marry her and even not to betroth her unless he
divorced her [the first wife] by a valid get, with her consent and without any
compulsion. The mentioned Rabbi [R. Eliezer of Nikopol] arranged the get, and the
proxy was R. Izhak who came from Eretz Israel bringing maintenance to his home. From
him I heard that Rabbi [Eliezer] arranged the get only on condition that the wife agreed
to accept it. If she refused, even after being offered payment, the get would be void and
the husband would be prohibited from marrying [the second woman] according the
ordinance of Rabbenu Gershom, light of the Diaspora, not to divorce one’s wife against
her will, especially a wife such as this one, who is fertile and without any defect in her
behavior, all the more so that he is not allowed to divorce her without her consent and
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without paying the Ketubbah money.

4. The wife agrees to divorce only after payment of the Ketubbah
When the mentioned scholar, R. Izhak, arrived with the get I called the wife and
inquired about her position. After a long investigation it became clear that she had no
intention of accepting the get unless the husband paid her the Ketubbah money.
This scholar told the wife: "My daughter, it is your right, and I have not come to compel
you or to tempt you, G-d forbid. Only for your benefit and with your consent, and also
there [in Pleven] he will not get a wife unless he divorces you according to your terms.

5. The husband marries another wife in Pleven
After some time it became known that her husband, Avraham Halevi, married a wife in
Pleven by Chupa and Kidushin, and the members of our community were shocked how
it came that such a villainy was perpetrated in Israel. We were informed by Jews who
arrived from your country and told us what happened and that they were present when
it occurred. One Jew, named Izka and nicknamed Charfan, a member of our community
[in Poland], brought a document signed by me [Rashal] and the leaders of the
community, that she [the first wife] had received lawfully a valid get and on this ground
they [in Pleven] allowed him to marry her [the second wife].

6. Forging of R. Luria‘s certificate by the husband's messenger
As we heard about this outrage, we went after him and investigated him, a little by
pressure and a little by temptation, until he confessed his sin and told us the details. The
mentioned Abraham [the husband] had hired him for some hundreds "whites" [a type of
coin] to [try to] obtain a document from our community stating that the wife accepted
the get – and if not, he should find criminals like himself who would forge a document
and sign my name and the name of other people from our community. And so he did
and received his payment.

7. Evidence to incriminate the husband
Now we must decide how to judge Abraham who deserted his wife and violated the ban
of R. Gershom. Although we cannot prove that Abraham knew about the misdeed and
we can argue that he did not send the messenger to act in a false way, but only to bring
an authentic document if the wife accepted the get, especially as Yazka [the messenger]
was a proven liar and disqualified from testifying. Nevertheless, as he [the messenger]
repented, returned the crime money, and confessed his many crimes, who could say that
he was not qualified to give evidence?! Moreover, in such a case we split the testimony
[of the messenger] and accept only the part that is not related to the witness himself. In
any case, he is still considered a single witness whose evidence is not decisive, but there
is circumstantial evidence to support it as Abraham [the husband] had betrayed his
young wife from the beginning, deserted her, and engaged another woman to marry.
And only G-d knows all the secrets, and we leave it at that.
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8. In principle, the husband’s bona fide does not nullify Chadrag
But even if he [Avraham] had acted bona fide, the ban of R. Gershom is still not lifted
and he should separate from the wife that he married in your place [Pleven], as I shall
prove with G-d’s help. Even if the ban of R. Gershom had not spread to your region but
he comes from the countries to which the ban has spread, it is forbidden to adopt a
lenient attitude [toward him].

9. Chadrag continues to apply to an Ashkenazi wherever he goes
This cannot be compared with the case of someone who leaves his place and goes to
another one without planning to return [in which case he is permitted to follow the
customs of the target place]. He [the husband] is obliged to return because his wife is
tied to him and relies on him, and he has no right to move her from country to country,
not even from a bad environment to a good one, as is written in the Babylonian Talmud,
Kethoboth [110b]. This is especially so when both are from the same country and from
the same town. Moreover, at the time of their marriage the ban of R. Gershom applied to
them and cannot be lifted by itself. This is easy to understand. Therefore, even if the
man lived with his [first] wife in your land or in countries to which the ban of R.
Gershom had not spread the man would not be allowed to marry another wife as the
prohibition had already been applied to him.

10. A precedent from a case of an Askenazi who moved to Eretz
Israel
This is what I heard about the case of a scholar from our land who went with his wife to
the land of Israel and stayed there a few years. He wanted to marry another wife, and
although he was able to support both the sages of the land of Israel did not allow him for
the same reason.

11. Denying Rashba's tradition
What Rashba wrote about having heard that R. Gershom banned only until the end of
the 5th millennium (1240 C.E.) and Maharik quoted in Ch. 101, is for us without any
base, like a rumor, and it is therefore denied. According to the argument of R. Avigdor,
which appears in the book Mordechai Gadol, in a responsum that begins with "I will go
to the great ones [and ask] what had R. Gershom enacted…" the reason [for the ban] is
relevant today as it was in those days, and there is no ground for distinguishing between
the 5th millennium and the 6th.
Another argument. All the Geonim such as Or Zarua in Yevamoth, Mordechai in the
name of R. Avigdor Katz in the chapter HaCholetz and also Smak wrote that if the
brother-in-law [yavam] is married he cannot perform the levirate marriage because of
the ban of R. Gershom, even in the opinion of those sages who hold that the levirate
commandment takes priority over the chaliza commandment. And all these Geonim
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lived in the 6th millennium, as it is well known.
Yet another argument. In most versions of the enactments of R. Gershom, the time [of
expiration] is not mentioned at all. On the contrary, in the enactment regarding two
wives he wrote: "That it is forbidden to lift [the ban] except with [the consent] of 100
sages from three communities and from three countries. And even then, they should not
lift [the ban] unless they find a good reason for doing it." If so, what good reason is there
that improves our society [today, so that we can argue that there is no need for the ban]?
On the contrary, because of our many sins, the generations have degenerated and are
changing for the worse day by day.
And even if you argue that [R. Gershom] banned only until the end of the 5th
millennium, and that the reason for the enactment was relevant only until the 5th
millennium, who lifted the ban? Is it not the case that we need another court, greater in
wisdom and in quorum to lift it? Evidence [to support this argument we find in the
verse] “return to your tents,” that even Israel were restricted only for a limited time and
although there was a reason for this restrict limitation, it was necessary that another
court lift the prohibition. So this is all the more the case here [regarding the ban of R.
Gershom]. This may be refuted by claiming that although no time limit was set for
abstinence from women, the reason for the abstinence, i.e., the giving of the Torah, did
not exist any more, nevertheless another decision by an authorized court was required,
as the Tosafist and the Rosh wrote.
In any case, I [Rashal] claim that the ban of R. Gershom was also structured in the same
way, as it is impossible to say that he wrote explicitly that his enactments would not
apply beyond the [beginning of the] 6th millennium. We never found this in his
enactments. But we must say that those who claim that the ban was only until the [end
of the] 5th millennium had a tradition based on the reasons for the ban, and from these
reasons it was deduced that R. Gershom banned only until the end of the 5th
millennium. If so, this is similar to the case of abstinence from women at the time of the
giving of the Torah, and there is a requirement for a decision by another court.

12. Bona fide on the part of the husband does not deny the Ban
We cannot argue in favor of him [the husband] that he married the other wife without
against his will, as a result of false evidence which caused him to fail, and that therefore
there is no ground for activating the ban of R. Gershom, which was enacted only ex ante
and not ex post. If this were the case, the majority of the sages would not forbid levirate
marriage when the brother-in-law [yavam] is married, which is also an unwilling
situation and ex post facto, as it is G-d’s rule and his order to consummate the levirate
marriage. nevertheless, the sages wrote that he is forced by the enactment of R.
Gershom [not to perform the levirate marriage], and the enactment has the power to
overrule it. This is the more so in this case, with the added argument that I wrote above:
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he [the husband] is the originator of this difficulty, and there is some circumstantial
evidence that he cheated. I also heard [about another case] that someone granted a get
according to the rabbi’s instructions and married another wife, and when later a defect
was found in the get he had to be separated from his second wife until he granted
another valid get. This is even more true in the present case.

13. The Talmudic rule of R. Ami against poligamy
And another argument. In the Talmud [Babylonian Talmud, Yevamoth, 65a] "Rabbi Ami
said, the man who married another wife is obliged to divorce her and pay the Kethuba".
And even though Rava opposes and says: "A man is permitted to marry some women
etc.", and R. Alfasi ruled in according him [Rava] as he is the later, even though he
[Alfasi] ruled so only if the husband is able to maintain both, as Alfasi himself wrote. We
can also distinguish that Rava allowed only wherever the first wife is infertile and he
[the husband] claimed that he wanted to check himself [by marrying another wife], but
in other circumstances, nay. So much more here that all this argument do not exist, that
also Rava would agree that the husband has to divorce his wife and pay the Kethubah.
Yet another argument. In the Talmud [Babylonian Talmud, Yevamoth, 65a], "Rabbi Ami
said, the man who married another wife is obliged to divorce her and pay the Ketubba."
And although Rava disagrees and says that "a man is permitted to marry several women,
etc.," and R. Alfasi ruled according to him [Rava] as he is the later [more recent],
although he [Alfasi] ruled so only in case the husband was able to maintain both [wives],
as Alfasi himself wrote. We also distinguish that Rava allowed it only when the first wife
was infertile and he [the husband] claimed that he wanted to check himself [by marrying
another wife], but in other circumstances he did not. So much more here, where all
these arguments do not exist, that Rava himself would agree that the husband must
divorce his wife and pay the Ketubba.

14. The husband violates his basic matrimonial obligations
The truth is that all this discussion is not needed except to separate him immediately
from his [second] wife, for he is sworn from Mount Sinai that he is obliged to [give his
wife] maintenance, clothing and sexual relations, which is impossible to provide for both
[wives] simultaneously. If so, who is to be denied? Surely the second one, who entered
the territory of the first. If so, the decision would have to be to coerce him to grant a get
to the second one and to pay her the Kethubah and to return to his first wife. But, the
first wife does not demand it, saying that he deserted her, so it is not convenient for her
to compel him [to stay with her] unless he freely agrees to do so. If he wishes to stay
with the other, she would let him go, but only after she obtains a get with the fulfillment
[of his obligation] according to the Kethubah or according to her willing compromise.

15. Conclusion: It is necessary to separate the husband from his
second wife
Therefore, you scholars, recognize the truth and the justice of the matter. It seems that
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you should separate him from his [second] wife immediately after reading my writing
until he remedies the wrong he did, as I wrote above. And should this malicious
husband be one of those rebels who refuse to follow the words of their teachers and
would not act according to my writing, I am the first to join you in imposing sanctions
on him, [and I shall be] like a snake that creeps on the earth and gnaws until he
renounces his evil ways.
This is the words of Shlomo Luria.
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שו''ת מהרש''ל
סימן י''ד
Shut Maharshal, Siman 14

Maharshal (Solomon Luria), 16th-17th century
Prepared by Elimelekh Westreich

א .שו"ת מהרש"ל סימן י"ד)(Res. Maharshal, 14
 .1פניה אל קהילת פליבנא ור' אליעזר מאניקופול
בני יהודא ועבר הירדן והגליל .הנושאים תוף וחליל .מושלים על ירח נראה בעליל .מוכתרים בנמוסי תפארת כליל.
הדורכים כוכב מיעקב וקם שבט פליל .מושלים בכל הגליל .ולכם יהיה השיר כליל .בפרט אתם הקרובים אל החלל.
ק"ק פליבנ"א יצ"ו בפרט המשכילים השרוים בתוכה יזהירו כזוהר .כעצם השמים לטוהר .בראש אקדים שלום .להחכם
השלם .שמו נודע ממרחקים .כאחד ממלכי ארקים .כשמן תורק .מכלי הורק .המופת כמהר"ר אליעזר הזקן .אשר כבוד
מנוחתו באניקופל שהוא מרי דעובדא י"ץ

 .2רקע – נטישת האישה שבפולין
מודענא לכון עובדא בישא דאיתא בחד מינן במנינכון שמו ר' אברהם בן שלמה הלוי בן עירינו והיה בשכבר נשוי אשה
אחת מעירינו שמה שרה בת חיים הלוי כי לקח איש לוי בת לוי להיות עמה נלוה כל הימים בצירוף הילד אשר חננו
אלקים קרוב לז' שנים וכל זאת לא שם על לבו ובגד באשת נעורים ברית כרותה מן השמים והניח אותה ערומה בחוסר
כל ולא זו שאחת משלש אלה לא עשה לה אלא אף זו התעמר בה בבגדו שלקח אשה אחרת עליה

 .3התגובה הראשונה של קהילת פליבנה
ואשריכם גודרי גדר המסירים יהודא וישראל מעון ,גזרתם עליו מתחלה שלא יכנוס אותה אף לא יארס אם לא שיפטור
הראשונה בגט כשר לרצונה ולא לאונסה כלל והרב הנזכר סידר גט זה והשליח היה משכיל שלם בכל דרכיו ה"ה ר'
יצחק י"ץ אשר בא מארץ ישראל והביא טרף לביתו ומפומיה שמעתי מילין שהרב לא סידר גט זה אלא בתנאי להפיס
דעת המגורשת באם תרצה ואם לא תרצה אף בריצוי כסף אזי הגט בטל ואסור לישא כתקנת ר"ג מ"ה שלא יכול לכוף
אותה לגירושין בפרט אשה כמותה שבת בנים היא ואין בה שמץ ודופי ק"ו שלא יגרש אותה בלא מילוי כתובתה שלא
לדעתה

 .4האישה מתנה הסכמתה לגירושין בתשלום הכתובה
והנה בהיותו החכם הנ"ל ר"י הנ"ל בכאן עם הגט שלחתי אחרי האשה לחקור ולידע תמצית עניינה ואחר רוב החקירה
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והדרישה נודע שאין בדעתה כלל וכלל לקבל גיטה אם לא שישלים כתובתה מקודם לידה והנה זה החכם הנ"ל הלך
לדרכו באמרו בתי הרשות נתונה בידך ולא באתי לכוף אותך ואף לא לפתותך ח"ו אלא להנאתך ולטובתך לדעתך כי גם
שמה לא יתנו לו אשה אם לא שיפטר אותך לפי רצונך ודעתך

 .5האיש נושא אישה בפליבנא בנוסף על אשתו בפולין
ואחר זמן מה נשמע שבעלה ר' אברהם הלוי לקח אשה בפליבנ"א ע"י חופה וקידושין ואתמוה קאמתמי בני ק"ק שלנו
על המעשה הרע אשר נעשה וכנבלה הזאת לא יעשה בישראל עד שנודע לנו מאנשי ישראל אשר באו מארציכם שסיפרו
לנו המאורע ואמרו שהיו אצל המעשה שיהודי א' שמו יצק"א מכונה חרפ"ן בן עירינו הביא כתב חתום ממני הח"מ עם
ראשי הקהלה שהיא קבלה הגט כדת וכהלכה ועל זה התירו לו להכניס אותה

 .6זיוף אישורו של המהרש"ל בידי השליח של האיש
ובשמעינו הנבלה הזאת שלחנו אחריו וחקרנו ודרשנו קצת בריצוי קצת בגיזום עד שהודה על חטאו ולא בוש וסיפר לנו
המעשה שאותו אברהם הנזכר השכיר אותו בכמה מאות לבנים שישתדל לו כתב מק"ק שלנו אם היא תקבל הגט כאן מה
טוב ונעים וא"ל אזי ישתדל בני בליעל כמותו שיזייפו כתב ויחתמו שמי ושם אנשי הקהילה וכן עשה וזה נתן לו שכרו
משלם

 .7האם יש בידינו ראיות להפליל את האיש בשל הזיוף?
 .1ועתה מטיבותיכם גמרינן מה דינו של אותו אברם אשר שיח"ת ברי"ת הלו"י ומעל בחרם ר"ג ואף שאין בידי
להוכיח שאברהם הנ"ל ידע מעובדא בישא ונוכל לתרוציה שעל מקרה הרע הזה לא שלח אותו ולא היה
במחשבתו אלא שיביא לו כתב הגון אם באמת יאורע שתקבל הגט בפרט מאחר שאותו יצק"א חרפ"ן גדפ"ן
הורע חזקת כשרותו ונעשה פסול לעדות
 .2מ"מ נוכל לומר מאחר שחוזר בתשובה במעשיו והשיב הגזילה ממה אשר נהנה במעל עון ורוצה לקבל תשובה
ומודה על עונותיו ברבים מאן נימא דלא כשר לאסהודי ועוד כל כה"ג פלגינן דיבוריה וקל ומ"מ עד א' הוא
ואיכא לצדודי לכאן ולכאן רק שרגלים לדבר הוא שמתחלה התחיל לבגוד באשת נעורים שהניחה על קרן הצבי
ונשתדך כבר עם אותה האשה ורחמנא ליבא בעי ויודע כל הנסתרות ול"ד ונניח מזה

 .8עקרונית :תום לבו של האיש אינו מסלק את חדר"ג
אף את"ל שאנוס הוא סוף סוף חרם דר"ג מי מתיר ג"כ אנוס הוא מכחיה ומחויב לפרוש מאשתו אשר לקח במקומכם
כאשר אוכיח בעז"ה אף שחרם ר"ג לא נתפשטה במקומכם ס"ס הוא מן המדינות אשר נתפשטה הגזירה ואין להקל בה.

 .9חדר"ג חל על האיש העוזב סביבה אשכנזית והולך לסביבה ספרדית
 .1ואין שייך כאן לדמות לההולך ממקום שנהגו ואין דעתו לחזור כו' חדא דמחויב לחזור דאיתתא אגידא ביה
ואכתפא דגברא שוור שאין בידו להוציאה ממדינה למדינה אפי' מנוה הרע לנוה היפה כדאיתא בכתובות )ק"י(:
בפרט מאחר ששניהם היו בני מדינה אחת ובני עיר אחת
 .2ועוד מאחר שבעת נשואין חל עליה חרם דר"ג מ"ה תו לא פקע מיניה איסורא וק"ל
 .3ומשום הכי אפילו אם היה עם אשתו בארציכם ובמדינות שלא נתפשטה חרם דר"ג אפ"ה לא היה יכול לישא
אחרת מאחר דחל עליה איסורא

 .10אסמכתה ממקרה של אשכנזי שהלך לארץ ישראל
וכה"ג שמעתי מעשה שמשכיל אחד מארצינו הלך עם אשתו לא"י ושהה לשם כמה שנים ורצה לישא עוד אחרת עליה
והיה יכולת בידו לאספוקי תרווייהו ואפ"ה לא הניחו לו חכמי א"י מהאי טעמא.

 .11דחיית המסורת שקצבה את תחולת חדר"ג עד שנת ה' אלפים )(1240
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ומה שכתב הרשב"א ששמע שר"ג לא גזר אלא לסוף אלף החמישי ומהררי"ק הביאו בשורש ק"א מ"מ האי
מילתא לית ליה עיקר גבן ומילתא פריחה כשמועה פורחת ע"כ היא נידחת
חדא דהא לפי טעם שכתב ר' אביגדור כהן במרדכי ארוך בתשובה אחת המתחלת אלכה לי אל הגדולים על מה
תיקן ר"ג כו' האי טעמא שייכת האידנא כמו מקדם ואין חילוק בין אלף חמישי לאלף הששי
ועוד כל הגאונים כגון הא"ז ביבמות והמרדכי בשם ר' אביגדור כ"ץ בפ' החולץ וכן הסמ"ק כתבו שאם היבם
נשוי שלא יכול ליבם מכח חרם דר"ג כו' ואפי' למאן דס"ל מצות יבום קודמת ואותן הגאונים כולן באלף הששי
היו כאשר ידוע
ועוד דברוב נוסח התקנות של ר"ג מ"ה לא הזכיר זמן ואדרבה כתב גבי תקנה דשתי נשים שאין להתיר אלא
בק' חכמים מג' קהילות ומג' ארצות כו' ואעפ"י כן לא יתירו עד שיראו טעם טוב בדבר עכ"ל וא"כ איזה טעם
טוב המשתנה לעילוי אלא אדרבא בעו"ה הדורות פוחתים ומשתנים לגריעותא מידי יום ויום
ואף את"ל שלא תיקן אלא לסוף אלף החמישי וג"כ היה טעם לתקנו שלא שייכא אלא עד סוף אלף החמישי
ס"ס מאן שרייה הלא צריך ב"ד אחר גדול בחכמה ובמניין כותיה להתירו וראייה משובו לכם לאהליכם שאף
ישראל לא נאסרו אלא לזמן קצוב וטעם למילייהו הוה אפ"ה צריך ב"ד אחר להתירו כדאיתא בפ"ק דביצה
)ה' (:ובפ' ד' מיתות )נ"ט (:ק"ו הכא אף שיש לשדות ביה נרגא ולומר שאני התם דלא קבע זמן לפרישתם
דקרא היו נכונים לשלשת ימים לא קאי אפרישת אשה שלאחריו אלא ה"ק היו נכונים לשלשת ימים כלומר
לקבל התורה ואח"כ אמר אל תגשו אל האשה ולא הוקבע זמן לפרישה זו אף שהטעם שבשבילו נאסר הפרישה
דהיינו מתן תורה בטל מ"מ צריך מניין אחר להתירו שהרי לא הוקבע זמן להדיא וכן כתבו התו' והרא"ש
מ"מ אומר אני בודאי תקנות ר"ג נמי כה"ג דאי אפשר לומר שפסק להדיא שלא יתקיימו גזירותיו ותקנותיו עד
אלף הששי ותו לא שהרי זו לא מצינו בין תקנותיו
אלא שצ"ל אותו שאומר שלא נגזרה אלא עד אלף החמישי היינו שכך היו מקובלין לפי הטעמים והסברות על
מה נתקנו גזירותיו יורה שלא גזר ותיקן אלא עד אלף החמישי א"כ הוי כפרישת אשה של מתן תורה וצריך
ב"ד אחר להתירו.

 .12תום לבו של האיש אינו מסלק את חדר"ג  -הוכחות
 .1וליכא למימר ולטעון לזכותו מאחר שבאונס אירע לו שלקח האשה על ידי עדות שקר שהכשילו אם כן ליכא
צד לגזירת ר"ג מ"ה שלא גזר אלא אלכתחילה ולא אדיעבד שאירע באונס
 .2וא"כ לא היו רוב הגאונים אוסרים ליבם היכא שנשוי כבר דהא ג"כ אונס הוא ובדיעבד דהא נפלה לפניו
בהרמנא דמלכא וגזירה היא מלפניו וכבר מושבע ועומד ליבמה אפ"ה כתבו הגאונים שאנוס הוא מתקנת ר"ג
ואלים כחיה להפקיע
 .3ק"ו הכא בצירוף הטעמים שכתבתי לעיל שהתחיל בתקלה וקלקלה ורגלים לדבר קצת שהערים בדבר ולא עוד
שמעתי אפי' מי שנתן גט ע"י הרב ולקח המגרש אשה אחרת ואח"כ נמצא פסול בגט שמפרישין אותו מן אשתו
עד יתקן גט אחר ק"ו בנדון דידן

 .13תחולת הלכת רבי אמי בתלמוד השוללת פוליגמיה
ועוד דינא דגמרא הוא בפ' הבא על יבמתו )ס"ה( א"ר אמי הנושא אשה על אשתו יוציא ויתן כתובה ואף שרבא פליג
ואומר נושא אדם כמה נשים כו' והרי"ף פסק כוותיה משום דבתראי הוא מ"מ לא פסק אלא היכא דאפשר למיקם
סיפוקייהו כמו שהביא הרי"ף וגם נוכל לחלק דאף רבא לא שרי אלא היכא דאשתו ראשונה אינה בת בנים והוא טען
אבדק נפשאי כו' כדאזלא התם סוגיא דשמעתא ועל זה קאי רבא וכן פי' הר"ן להדיא אבל בע"א לא ק"ו הכא דליכא כל
הני טעמא דאף רבא מודה דיוציא ויתן כתובתה

 .14האיש מפר את חובות האישות הבסיסיות
 .1והאמת שכמעט כל הפילפול שלא לצורך הוא אלא לאחמורי עליה ולאפרושי מיד מאתתא דהא כבר מושבע
ועומד מהר סיני שנשתעבד בשאירה וכסותה ועונתה וזה שאי אפשר לקיים שניהם כאחת א"כ מי נדחה מפני מי
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הלא השניה באה בגבולה של ראשונה א"כ היה מן הדין לכופו שיתן גט לשניה ויתן לה כתובתה ויחזור לאשתו
הראשונה
 .2אבל הראשונה מותרת על זה באמרה מאחר שהמריד בי לא ניחא כ"כ לכוף אותו א"ל מרצונו ואם ירצה לדבוק
באחרת הרשות נתונה בו רק שמקודם יגיע גט כשר לידה עם מילוי כתובתה או במה שתתפשר ברצונה הטוב

 .15מסקנה :יש להפריד בין האיש ובין אשתו השנייה
ולכן אתם המשכילים הכירו נא דבר אמת הדין ודת למי המשפט והעזר ע"כ נראה מן הראוי להפרישו מאשתו מיד אחרי
ראות כתיבתי עד שיתקן עיותו כפי אשר כתבתי לעיל ואם יהיה זה הבעל בן בליעל ח"ו מן המורדים הנותנים כתף
סוררת לדברי מוריהם ולא יעשה כפי שכתבנו והוכחנו ולא ישמע אליכם אזי ידי עמכם בראשונה למחייה בסיל' דלא
מבע דמא והריני נגרר אחריכם כנחש הזוחל על העפר להטיל בו ארס וחמ' עד ישוב מרשעו ובזכות כו' דברי שלמה
לורי"א.
Publisher: The texts were first publisheda hundred years ago and even earlier, and
afterwards were fotocopied many times. Part of the texts exist online.
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Responsa Maharshal No. 65
Shut Maharshal

16 ,שלמה לוריא- מהרש''לth-17th century
Translated by Elimelech (Melech) Westreich, Tel Aviv University Law School, Israel

Res. Maharshal, Ch. 65

Question: A wife whose menstruation was disrupted
A man who was married some years and lived together until she was subjected to the
rigor of the law and having deteriorated to the point where she saw blood with the
occasion of each intercourse and he was prohibited from having intercourse with her.
The question is: do we allow the man to divorce her against her will? although R.
Gershom’s ban prohibits divorcing [a wife] against her will, in such a case this is
permitted because R. Gershom had not issued the ban in order to annul the
commandment to be fruitful and multiply. This is not less serious than the case in which
the wife became insane that he [the husband] was allowed to divorce her against her will
by proxy and deposit her Ketubba so that she receives her get. [The reason for this is]
the commandment to be fruitful and multiply, [which applies] even if she may recover
and return to sanity. All the more so here, when she has no chance of recovering and
returning to live with the man, he is allowed to divorce her against her will.

1. The case of the Italian student whose wife became insane
Although divorcing a woman against her will in case of insanity is obvious to you, this is
not my position. here is a copy of what I wrote some time ago about a case that occurred
at a place where scholars gathered. A young scholar arrived from Italy to this kingdom
to study in the Yeshivot here. His wife had become insane in his country some years
earlier. After studying about two years, the matchmaker offered him a woman and he
agreed. But the father of the virgin and her relatives opposed it until he obtained
permission from our rabbis that he was allowed to marry another wife. And he was
brave as a lion and quick as a gazelle to fulfill the requirements [of the father and of the
relatives], and asked our rabbis to permit him to divorce [his Italian wife] and marry
another.
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2. The position of Rashal in the case of the Italian student
I refused to agree with them but I did not oppose them either, as I had no halachic
arguments with which to contradict their position, as their argument was that R.
Gershom, the light of the Diaspora, did not enacted [his ban] in order to annul the
commandment to be fruitful and multiply. And they [the rabbis] allowed him to deposit
a get with a proxy so that if she returned to sanity she would receive the get and her
Ketubba. After the deed was done it was done [and we can not change it], but my
conscience nagged me. And some years later I searched in the big book of Ravia and
found that the great sages had forbidden [this action] in practice [in the case of the
insane], and here are their responsa…

3. Ravia absolutely prohibited lifting R. Gershom's ban
We briefly answered R. Simcha about the insane wife. We inform our teacher about
[another] case, that of R. Shmuel b. Azriel of Mainz, whose wife was insane like the wife
about whom you wrote us. And he [R. Shmuel b. Azriel] and his father came to the
synod of the communities and several times cancelled the prayers because of canceling
the commandment to be fruitful and multiply, and he demanded to lift the ban of R.
Gershom. And they [the rabbis of the synod] refused to lift the ban and argued that it is
better to loose one soul and not to cause a breakdown for the coming generations. He
also went to Bonn, and there also the rabbis refused to lift the ban. Similarly in the
current case, we are wary of lifting the ban, especially because in the case [of R. Shmuel
b. Azriel] there were rumors about concealed relations [between R. Shmuel b. Azriel and
another woman] and even so they refused to grant permission.

4. The position of Rashal in the case of the insane wife
And from now on my [Rashal] opinion is to forbid him even post factum to divorce her
by a proxy who holds the get and the Ketubba until she may recover.All the more so if he
divorces her [directly] with the wife receiving the get, even if she were able to keep the
get and check it, but she is unable to keep herself [from men] even if she has a father or
a brother [to keep her]. And this is also the case [the divorce is not valid] of a wife who is
at times sane and at times not.
Moreover I say that even in case that the wife is at times entirely sane and agrees to
receive the get, and her relatives also agree, it is forbidden to divorce her without
permission of the court, which would verify the truth of the facts, i.e., that she would be
kept from looseness. But without their [the court’s] consent, I decline to allow the
husband to marry another wife even if she [the first wife] was entirely sane at the time of
receiving the get.

5. Menstruation disorder is not a ground for lifting the ban
You assume that it is absolutely legitimate to divorce an insane wife because you heard
the case of the young scholar [from Italy], and I did not oppose it at the time. But from
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now on my opinion is to forbid it. Similarly in the case [of menstruation disorder] you
asked me about, I have no power to lift the ban and permit divorcing her against her
will, as we can argue that his field was swept away. Even though, the sages in this town,
has to put in effort and try to attract her so that she would agree to receive willingly the
Get.
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שו''ת מהרש''ל
סימן ס''ה
Shut Maharshal

th-17th centuryמהרש''ל -שלמה לוריא16 ,
Prepared by Elimelekh Westreich

ב .שו"ת מהרש"ל סימן ס"ה (Res. Maharshal, 65) -
שאלה :אישה שנשתבש מחזורה החודשי
אחד היה לו אשה כמה שנים ונהגו יחד כאורח כל ארעא עד שבא עליה מידת הדין ונתקללה עד שראתה מחמת תשמיש
כל פעם ופעם עד שהוחזקה לו באיסור עולמית אי שרינן ליה להוציא בכתובה בעל כרחה אף שר' גרשון מ"ה גזר שלא
לגרש בעל כרחה כה"ג בודאי מודה ולא גזר רבי גרשון לבטל פריה ורביה ולא גרע מהיכא שנשתגעת שיכול לגרשה על
ידי שליח וליחד לה כתובה באם תתפקח תקבל גיטה משום בטול פריה ורביה אף שאפשר שתחזור ותשתפה מכ"ש הכא
שאין לה תיקון עולמית להאי גברא שיגרשנה בע"כ ויתן לה כתובתה.

תשובה
 .1המקרה של התלמיד מאיטליה שאשתו נשתטית
מה שברור בעיניך לגרש בע"כ היכא דנשתטית לא כך עמדי ואעתיק לך מה שכתבתי בשכבר עובדא חדא הוית במקום
ועד בצורב אחד שבא מארץ לועז שנשתגעה אשתו לשם במדינתו כמה שנים ובא ללמוד במלכות זו בישיבות ולמד כמו
שתי שנים ושדכו לו השדכנים אשה ונאות היה לדבר אלא שאבי הבתולה וקרוביה לא רצו בדבר עד שיביא התרה
מרבותינו שיכול לישא אחרת והיה גיבור כארי ורץ כצבי לעשות רצונו ורצונם ונפל לפני שאר רבותינו שיתירו לו
לגרשה ולישא אשה אחרת

 .2עמדת המהרש"ל במקרה של התלמיד מאיטליה
ולא ניאותי להסכים עמהם ומ"מ לא חלקתי עליהם כי לא היה בידי עזר לקפח אותם בהלכה כי כל ראייתם שר"ג מ"ה
לא תיקן לבטל פריה ורביה והתירו לו שיתן גט וימסור ליד אחד באם תתפקח שתקבל גיטה וכתובתה ואחר שנעשה
המעשה בודאי מה נעשה אבל לבי נוקפי ואחר כמה שנים חפשתי בספר ראבי"ה הגדול ומצאתי שכבר אסרו הגדולים
הלכה למעשה וכן עיקר והא לך תשובת'... .

 .3תשובת ראבי"ה האוסרת לחלוטין התרת חדר"ג
דרך קצרה השבנו למורנו הרב ר' שמחה על דבר האשה שנשטית /שנשתטית /יודע למורי כי ראינו בנו של ר' שמואל
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בר עזריאל ממגנצא שהיתה אשתו משועממת ושוטה כדרך זאת האשה שכתבת ובאו הוא ואביו בוועד הקהילות והיה
מבטל תפילות מפני ביטול פריה ורביה כמה פעמים והיה מבקש התרת חרם הגאון הגדול מאור גולה ולא רצו להתיר לו
ואמרו מוטב להפסיד נפש אחד מלעשות קילקול לדורות הבאים גם לבונא בא ולא הועיל ולא הסכימו רבותינו להתיר
לכן יראנו גם אנחנו להסכים פן ח"ו יבא לקילקול ואף כי היו מלאים בניהוג הסת' דבר אפי' הכי לא התירו לו
תשובות אלו העתקתי מספ' ראבי"ה והתשובו' היו בלתי מתוקנים לרוב טעות לפי שבאו מסופר אל סופר ובעזרת האל
יגעתי ומצאתי לתקנם על מכונם לפי הירושלמי שהיו לפניהם ואף ביניהם היה חילוק בגירסאות ...

 .4עמדתו המגובשת של המהרש"ל בעניין התרת חדר"ג באישה שנשתטית.
ומהיום דעתי נוטה לאסור עליו אפי' בדיעבד כשיגרש ע"י שליח להולכה שיהיה בידו הגט והכתובה עד שתשתפה וכ"ש
כשגירש אותה בקבלתה אפי' יכולה לשמור את גיטה ע"י בדיקה אלא שאינה יכולה לשמור את עצמה אפי' יש לה אב או
אח וכן אפי' עתים שוטה עתים חלומה.
ועוד אני אומר אפי' היא לפעמים חלומה ממש ומתרצה לגט וכן קרוביה מסכימין לכך אפ"ה אין לגרשה בלי רשות ב"ד
שידעו באמיתת הדברים שיכולים לשמור אותה שלא ינהגו בה מנהג הפקר אבל בלתי רצונם ועת שפויה שהיא חלומה
ממש אין היתר בעיני מהיום אפי' בדיעבד לישא אחרת ע"כ.

 .5אישה שנשתבש מחזורה החודשי – אין מתירים את חדר"ג
והנה מה שדמית בעיניך שהיתר גמור הוא לגרש היכא שנשטית היינו ששמעת המעשה שהתירו להאי צורבא מדרבנן
מטעם שהחרשתי בעת ההיא אבל מעתה והלאה דעתי לאוסרו גם בנדון ששאלת אין כח בידי להתיר חרם ר"ג ולגרשה
בע"כ דאימר נסתחפה שדיהו ומ"מ ראוי לחכמים שבאותו עיר שיגעו בעניין וימצאו מקום לפתות אותה שתקבל גט
מרצון בכל דצטקי /טצדקי /ותחבולה האפשרית ושלום דברי שלמה לורי"א.

Publisher: The texts were first publisheda hundred years ago and even earlier, and
afterwards were fotocopied many times. Part of the texts exist online.
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Introduction to Shulchan Aruch and Hagahoth Remu,
Even Ha-Ezer, 1:10
Elimelech (Melech) Westreich, Tel Aviv University Law School, Israel

The Legal Status of the Wife in Ashkenazi Jewish Legal
Tradition:
Continuity and Change in the Sixteenth Century
Elimelech Westreich
The ban of Rabbenu Gershom forbade both polygamy and divorcing a woman against
her will. The ban has been seen by historians as a key determinant of the singularity of
Ashkenazi Jewish culture. In sixteenth-century Poland there were two main approaches
among halakhic scholars: one, represented by R. Solomon Luria adhered strictly to the
Ashkenazi legal tradition; the second, represented by R. Shalom Shakhna and R. Moses
Isserles, was open to other Jewish legal traditions. Is this phenomenon related to the
Early Modern Period? And if so, how is it related? My discussion in the workshop will
focus on these questions.
In the middle ages, Ashkenazi Jewish women enjoyed strong legal protection of their
marital status through R. Gershon’s ban (Chadrag), which prohibited marrying a second
wife and divorcing a woman against her will. The high status of the enactments was
manifested in three areas: (1) their legal basis, which was legislation in the publiccriminal area of the law; (2) the rejection of solid grounds on the part of the husband,
such as observance of the commandment to be fruitful and multiply or of the levirate
commandment, and at times even of a combination of such grounds (as, for example,
when the woman was out of her mind and the man did not observe with her the
commandment to be fruitful and multiply and could not maintain matrimonial
relations); and (3) the procedural area, which specifies the rigid and complicated
process required to lift the ban and the sanctions imposed in case it is violated. The
prestige and strength that the two enactments enjoyed was the outcome of a long
process resulting, among others, from such halachic changes as the decline of the
halacha of the rebellious woman, which enabled women to coerce their husbands to
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divorce them. Ashkenazi Jewish society internalized the enactments very deeply, to the
point where bigamist marriage was perceived as living with a legal wife and a prostitute.
Throughout the middle ages, the presence of other traditions in Spain, the
Mediterranean basin, and in the East did not pose a threat to the Ashkenazi tradition on
its territory. The encounter between the legal traditions of the various communities
always took place on non-Ashkenazi territory. When he served as rabbi of Spain at the
first quarter of the fourteen century, Rosh tried to inculcate there the Ashkenazi
tradition, directly and indirectly. At this time, in Spain, Rashba was asked by an
Ashkenazi scholar to lift Chadrag because of his wife’s insanity, after his request was
refused in Ashkenaz. This sage is also the originator of the rumor that Chadrag expired
at the end of the fifth millennium (1240), which in time would play an important role in
the halachic discussion. A hundred a fifty years later, in a legal debate, Maharil raised
the possibility that a man whose wife lost her mind can go to Italy, where Chadrag may
be lifted.
Only at the end of the 15th century is there a serious challenge placed before a great
Ashkenazi sage, R. Yehuda Mintz, who served as the rabbi of Padua in the Venetian
Republic. R. Gershon Bonfazo, the Romaniot rabbi of Corfu, married a second wife
because he was not able to perform the commandment to be fruitful and multiply with
his first wife, an action that received the approval of the Romaniot R. Eliahu Mizrahi,
head of the rabbis in the Ottoman Empire. R. Yehuda Mintz adopted an extreme attitude
in preferring Chadrag over the commandment, and banned the Romaniot rabbi for his
action. R. Yehuda Mintz based his position on purely Ashkenazi sources as well as on
discretion and opinion, but did not address various Sephardic sources that opposed his
view. Some decades later, however, a significant change occurred in the community of
Ashkenazi rabbis there. R. Meir of Padua, the husband of R. Mintz’s granddaughter and
heir to his position at the head of the Padua Yeshiva, rejected the approach that
strengthens Chadrag beyond measure, and gave decisive weight to Sephardic sources
that reject Chadrag in favor of the commandments.
The Polish extension of the Ashkenazi community, which by the 16th century had risen
in quality and quantity above the motherland in Ashkenaz, faced a new reality that
reflected the changes occurring at the beginning of the modern era. At this time, the
large Jewish centers were growing closer to each other, resulting in a phenomenon of
mini-globalization or regionalization. This was reflected in the discussion by Rashal of
the first case [Res. Maharshal, Ch. 14] of a member of his community who left his wife in
Poland and went to the town of Pleven, in the Ottoman Empire. In this region and
around it lived Jews of other communities that, unlike the Ashkenazim, did not grant
Chadrag a high legal status. The Romaniots apparently recognized that Chadrag applied
to them, but held that it was superseded by commandments such as that to be fruitful
and multiply. Moreover, they did not enhance the strength of Chadrag in the areas of
enforcement and relief. The Sephardim did not consider themselves to be subject the
Chadrag at all, and a tradition existed among them that even with respect to
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Ashkenazim Chadrag expired at the end of the fifth millennium.
The proximity between the centers was manifest in the quality of the communication
between them, which took place nearly in real time and on several levels. The constant
correspondence and traffic of messengers between the centers is described in detail in
the responsa and integrated in the halachic debate. The connection also produced a
strong dependence between the legal work taking place in Poland and the required close
cooperation between the legal institutions in the two locations. This phenomenon
contains pure elements of private international law intended to enable cooperation
between different autonomous legal systems.
The importance of the flow of information in this case is clear, as the challenge to the
validity of Chadrag, at least under certain circumstances, is the moving force behind the
entire case. This flow seems to have been made possible by an additional factor that
appeared at this time, the invention of the printing press. Rashba’s responsa, that had
been recently printed, and the printing of the work of R. Yosef Karo and of the books of
responsa of such Italian sages as Maharik, Mahari Mintz, and Maharam Padua quickly
made public the tradition regarding the expiration of Chadrag and the associated
debates. The links made possible by the printing press are even more prominent in the
legal work of Rama. In his comments to Shulhan Aruch as well as in his work Darkei
Moshe, he expresses positions other than those common in the Ashkenazi tradition,
which contributed to the erosion of at least the moral dimension of Chadrag, and from
then on the claims concerning its expiration and the preeminence of the
commandments became legitimate. However, Rama eventually ruled that Chadrag
remains valid and that violators who marry a second wife must be coerced.
The conduct of Rama was similar to that of his great Sephardic colleague, R. Yosef Karo,
who also featured in his writings approaches that differed from his own even if he
eventually summarized the halacha according to his own views. This approach was
radically different from that reflected in the writings and rulings of Rashal, Rama’s
Polish colleague. Rashal rejected unequivocally the tradition claiming that Chadrag had
expired at the end of the fifth millennium, and criticized Rashba mercilessly. He also
went to extremes in the second answer [paragraph 65], and sharpened further the
Ashkenazi legal tradition by making Chadrag a nearly absolute legal factor, not to be
lifted even in extreme circumstances in which several reasons converge: the insanity of
the wife, impossibility to maintain matrimonial relations, and impossibility of observing
the commandment to be fruitful and multiply. This tendency was further underscored
by the nature of the sources that Rashal quoted in his answer. Unlike Rama, who
absorbed the new products of the printing press, Rashal surveyed old Ashkenazi
manuscripts and found Raviya’s answer, which had been shelved for four hundred years.
This answer became the basis for the opposition to any attempt to lift either component
of Chadrag, whatever the reasons of the husband may be.
Eventually, Rama’s method, which was open to changes occurring at the beginning of
the modern era and communicated with the important sages of the large center being
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formed in the Ottoman Empire, was preferred over Rashal’s conservative method that
sought to perpetuate the Ashkenazi halachic past and maintain it in splendid isolation.
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Shulkhan Arukh, Glosses by Moses Isserles
Even Ha-Ezer, 1:10
Shulhan `Arukh, HaGahoth ha-Rama

Moses Isserles, 2nd half of the 16th century, 1st half of the 17th
century
Translated by Elimelech (Melech) Westreich, Tel Aviv University Law School, Israel

' סימן א סעיף י, אבן העזר, שולחן ערוך והגהות הרמ"א.ג
(Shulchan Aruch and Hagahoth Remu, Even Ha-Ezer, 1:10 )
R. Gershom banned a man who married bigamously, but in a case of a levirate marriage
]yevamah] he did not ban, and neither did he in the case of a betrothed woman.
1. Gloss ha-Remu: If he refuses to marry [the betrothed] but wants to divorce her. The
rule applies in case a commandment is not observed, like the case of a man who stayed
with his wife for ten years and she has not given birth. But there are sages who oppose
this and maintain that the ban of R. Gershom is valid also if the commandment is not
observed and even in the case of a levirate marriage, and he [the husband] must perform
halitza [to his brother's widow]. But, if the first wife is not divorceable, as in the case
that she has become insane or she is obliged to be divorced but refuses to receive the
get, we can be lenient and allow him to marry another wife, all the more so if she is
betrothed but refuses to marry him or to divorce him.

2. And his enactment had not spread to all the countries.
Gloss ha-RemuPrecisely in places in which we know [positively] that the enactment had
not spread, but probably it is the usage in every place. See Yoreh Deah, Ch. 228, if he
moved from a place where the custom was strict to one where it was applied leniently.

3. And he did not ban but until the end of the fifth millennium.
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Gloss ha-Remu: In all these countries the enactment and the custom are still valid,
people do not marry bigamously, and [the authorities] use banishment and ban to
coerce those who married bigamously to divorce one of them. Some sages say that in
these days it is not allowed to coerce [by banishment] a man who violated the ban of R.
Gershom, as the fifth millennium has ended, but we do not conduct ourselves according
to this view. Some sages say that a man whose wife converted grants the get to a another
[as her proxy] and is permitted to marry another, and this is the usage in some places.
But in places in which there is no a specific custom [and a requirement to deposit a get]
there is no need for strictness and it is permitted to marry another without divorcing the
first wife.
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שולחן ערוך ,הגהות רמ''א
Shulhan `Arukh, HaGahoth ha-Rama

Moses Isserles, 2nd half of the 16th century, 1st half of the 17th
century
Prepared by Elimelech (Melech) Westreich, Tel Aviv University Law School, Israel

ג .שולחן ערוך והגהות הרמ"א ,אבן העזר ,סימן א סעיף י'
) (Shulchan Aruch and Hagahoth Remu, Even Ha-Ezer, 1:10

]שולחן ערוך[ רבינו גרשום החרים על הנושא על אשתו ,אבל ביבמה לא החרים ,וכן בארוסה.
הגה :אם אינו רוצה לכנוס אלא לפטור וה"ה בכל מקום שיש דיחוי מצוה ,כגון ששהה עם אשתו עשר שנים ולא ילדה
אמנם יש חולקים וסברא ליה דחרם ר"ג נוהג אפילו במקום מצוה ואפילו במקום יבום ,וצריך לחלוץ .ובמקום שאין
הראשונה בת גירושין ,כגון שנשתטית או שהוא מן הדין לגרשה ואינה רוצה ליקח גט ממנו ,יש להקל להתיר לו לישא
אחרת .וכל שכן אם היא ארוסה ואינה רוצה להנשא לו או לפטור ממנו.
]שולחן ערוך[ ולא פשטה תקנתו בכל הארצות.
הגה :ודוקא במקום שידוע שלא פשטה תקנתו ,אבל מן הסתם נוהג בכל מקום .ועיין בי"ד סי' רכ"ח אם הלך ממקום
שנהגו להחמיר למקום שנהגו להקל.
]שולחן ערוך[ ולא החרים אלא עד סוף האלף החמישי.
הגה :ומ"מ בכל מדינות אלו התקנה והמנהג במקומו עומד ,ואין נושאין שתי נשים ,וכופין בחרמות ונדויין מי שעובר
ונושא ב' נשים לגרש אחת מהן .וי"א דבזמן הזה אין לכוף מי שעבר חרם ר"ג מאחר שכבר נשלם אלף החמישי ,ואין
נוהגין כן .י"א מי שהמירה אשתו ,מזכה לה גט ע"י אחר ונושא אחרת ,וכן נוהגין במקצת מקומות .ובמקום שאין מנהג
אין להחמיר ומותר לישא אחרת בלא גירושי הראשונה.
Publisher: The texts were first publisheda hundred years ago and even earlier, and
afterwards were fotocopied many times. Part of the texts exist online.
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